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1. Introduction
The global energy landscape and operating environment of the electricity supply 
industry (ESI) are undergoing a slow but certain transformation. The electricity 
sector is waking up to new disruptions occurring at the grid’s edge (Arriaga et al. 
2017). Distributed energy, consumer demand for cleaner energy and technological 
progress is reshaping the traditional and centralized fossil fuel-based electricity 
systems to accommodate variable renewables and other network-related loads 
(Sioshansi, 2017). The number of consumers becoming ‘prosumers’1, either through 
improvements in energy efficiency or through distributed energy resources is also 
on the rise. These changes will become more pronounced as energy storage 
advances into a viable grid-based resource. 
Falling wholesale energy prices at a time of rising generation costs, stagnant growth 
in energy demand and growing penetration of renewable energy and other 
distributed energy resources are part of the transformation (Sioshansi, 2015). These 
changes were not anticipated by policy-makers advocating market-based reforms 
in the early 1990s which were largely motivated by the breakdown of the traditional 
economies of scale argument associated with vertical integration of the electricity 
industry, and the subsequent potential for stimulating competition to drive prices 
lower, whilst encouraging innovation in generation and retail supply. “Competition 
where feasible, regulation where not” was the overriding principle of market-based 
reforms (Newbery, 2002). Electricity sector restructuring, when coupled with 
effective regulation and competition, was expected to deliver significant consumer 
benefits when designed and implemented well (Joskow, 2003). 
A generic high-level reform of the ESI (the “standard approach” involves measures 
such as: corporatisation, vertical unbundling (separation) and restructuring of the 
sector, introducing competition in the wholesale generation and supply, horizontal 
separation of incumbents to create viable competition, establishing an independent 
regulatory authority, and privatization of competitive segments of the ESI (Jamasb 
et al., 2017). The extent of vertical separation has varied across functional, 
accounting, legal, or ownership separation. Vertical separation was also expected to 
prevent cross-subsidization between competitive and regulated network 
businesses and discriminatory behaviour such as denial of access to networks 
(Joskow, 1998). 
1 A ‘prosumer’ is an economic agent such as a household that supplies excess energy produced to the 
grid (producer) as well as consumes electricity from the grid (consumer). 
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The dominant focus of much policy attention of late has been on the suitability of 
electricity market reform carried out under this ‘standard’ or prescriptive approach 
– the end point of which is market liberalization – for the integration of intermittent 
renewables. There is now a growing consensus around the argument that traditional 
energy-only electricity markets where prices (and investment signals) are based on 
system marginal cost cannot function efficiently with both fossil fuels (which have 
high marginal costs) and renewables (which have zero marginal costs), potentially 
resulting in market disruptions and price volatility. Consequently, most policy work 
has tended to centre on finding ways to successfully integrate renewables and fossil 
fuels through adopting more advanced competitive solutions (such as the use of 
capacity markets in addition to energy-only markets) (Sen et al., 2016). 
This paper however argues that the effectiveness of competition is limited by the 
size of an electricity system – in other words, there is a minimum threshold size (and 
other associated characteristics) under which competition by itself will not produce 
expected outcomes, and for which distinctive policy solutions are required in order 
to resolve the problem of renewables scaling up and integration. Small electricity 
systems have a distinctive set of characteristics, implying that the economic 
rationale that underpinned the reform of large electricity sectors is not readily 
applicable to small and isolated electricity systems, as the benefits from increased 
competition are limited. Yet, this has not deterred policymakers from attempting the 
“standard approach” to reforms and market liberalisation in small energy systems 
worldwide, including for instance Australia’s Northern Territory electricity market 
(Nepal and Menezes, 2017). At the same time, many countries (or territories) with 
small electricity systems have ambitious renewable energy targets, and in principle 
face the same policy problems as “larger” or more conventional electricity systems 
worldwide, although the drivers behind these targets are related to electricity 
access for remote communities rather than decarbonisation per se. 
Given an absence of prior literature on electricity reforms which accounts for the 
distinctive circumstances of small power systems, there is limited scope for learning 
from previous experience for such systems, which account for a small but important 
number of island economies in the Asia Pacific, South East Asia and the Caribbean 
which are particularly vulnerable to climate change, and where reform objectives 
have consequently included market restructuring  alongside improving access and 
scaling up renewables (Nepal and Jamasb, 2012a; Nepal and Menezes, 2017). This 
study attempts to fill the gap in literature by reviewing policy experience in three 
small electricity systems: two of these – Nicaragua and El Salvador - have 
successfully integrated renewables to over 50% of generation within the space of a 
few years – and based on these countries’ experience we identify a number of 
practical policy solutions. We propose that a third, Australia’s Northern Territory, 
closely fits the generic case for the adoption of a similar approach, as the Territory 
has adopted an ambitious renewable energy target in the midst of ongoing power 
sector reforms. We conclude with a set of policy options which should be considered 
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for countries or territories which face the problem of reforming electricity markets 
to integrate renewables, and which fit the characteristics of small electricity 
systems. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 begins by outlining 
the characteristics of small electricity systems and sets out preliminary arguments 
on why small systems could adopt renewables integration alongside following the 
‘standard’ model of electricity reforms. Section 3 presents case studies on Nicaragua 
and El Salvador – two successful cases of electricity market reform and renewables 
integration in small systems - documenting existing policies and arrangements for 
renewable energy development in these markets. It then describes the common 
features of Australia’s Northern Territory which it argues lends itself to a similar 
approach. Section 4 synthesises the policy lessons drawn from the case studies, 
applicable to small electricity systems across the Asia Pacific, Caribbean and 
Southeast Asia, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Characteristics of Small Electricity Systems 
 
The problems faced by economies with small power systems in market reforms are 
similar to those faced by larger systems, although with varying intensity (Besant-
Jones, 2006). The ‘standard’ model of reforms was based on the successful 
experiences of countries with large electricity sectors such as Chile, Argentina the 
UK. As such, market-based reform may have lesser relevance to small systems 
(Bacon, 1994). “Small” electricity systems can be defined by a set of distinctive 
characteristics. These include the following. 
(a) In absolute terms, the literature defines a small electricity system as one that 
has an installed electricity capacity of under 1,000 Megawatts (MW) (Besant-
Jones, 2006). This is, however, not the sole characteristic. 
 
(b) An electricity system can also be considered “smaller” relative to a wider 
electricity market – this could include a system situated within a wider 
country (such as provincial markets in Australia), or within a wider region 
(such as individual systems within a transnational network – for instance the 
countries within Latin America’s SIEPAC network) which accounts for a small 
proportion of that overall system. The Single Electricity Market (SEM) in 
Ireland is an example of a smaller and isolated market in the European 
context (Nepal and Jamasb, 2012b). An important noticeable trend among 
small power systems globally is the formation of power trade areas with 
neighbouring countries. The Southern Africa Power Pool and SIEPAC in 
Central America are some examples (Besant-Jones, 2006). 
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(c) In many smaller electricity systems, energy demand is often too low (and the 
demand base too small) to allow the benefits of greater competition to 
manifest – for instance, through the lowering of consumer electricity prices. 
Small electricity systems are also sensitive to the impact of large foreign 
investors (mostly) and developers in electricity generation and distribution 
(Besant-Jones, 2006). 
 
(d) The benefits of introducing greater competition in small electricity systems 
may also be lower than the transaction costs involved in fostering 
competition. Alternatively, the benefits of introducing greater competition in 
small systems may be lower than the benefits obtained from economies of 
coordination and scope under vertical integration. The costs of vertical 
separation may be so large to offset the gains from competition even when it 
is possible to introduce limited competition in generation and achieve some 
benefits (Bacon, 1994). Hence, countries will small electricity systems can 
have intermediate reform options although some degree of vertical 
separation is likely to improve quality of services and lower costs. 
 
(e) Many small systems are geographically distinctive, and prevalent largely 
among countries in the tropics with higher energy demand (Central America, 
the Pacific islands and the Caribbean). Given their often maritime locations 
and vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and oil market volatility, 
many small electricity systems have adopted ambitious renewable energy 
targets. Small electricity systems in the tropics also often host remote 
communities with relatively poor electricity access. Finally, small electricity 
systems in the tropics generally have more reliable resources of renewables 
to draw on, such as continuous/more predictable solar, and often hydro, 
rather than solely relying on imported fossil fuels. As of 2014, there are 
around 88 small electricity systems in the world measured in terms of 
installed generation capacities (see table 1A in Appendix). These small 
systems are predominantly located in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. 
An earlier study by Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001) had estimated that 
around 100 countries to have power markets under 1000 MW. 
Riding on the ‘wave’ of popularity of electricity market reforms that were initiated 
and spread worldwide in the 1990s, several small systems have undertaken the 
process of restructuring their sectors to introduce greater competition. Examples 
include countries in Africa, and islands and territories in the Caribbean and the 
Pacific (Weisser, 2004). Electricity market reforms have however been widely 
critiqued in the literature on their unsuitability for the scaling up and integration of 
renewables (Keay et al, 2013; Sen, 2014; Sen et al, 2016). To summarise this debate, 
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in energy-only markets that were originally designed for fossil fuels, where prices 
are set based on system marginal costs, the incorporation of zero marginal cost 
renewables can potentially lead to price volatility, and prices would be zero (or very 
low) during periods when renewables are plentiful (i.e. the sun is shining or the 
wind is blowing) or conversely they would need to be very high when renewables 
are altogether unavailable, in order to incentivise investors to build the backup 
generation that would be required to stabilise the system.2 
Given the distinctive characteristics of small electricity systems and the limits of 
competition in these systems as described above, these systems have a wider range 
of options available to them, without risking market disruption or hindering market 
design, in terms of supporting the development of renewable energy alongside 
restructuring their electricity sectors to operate more efficiently. The size of small 
electricity systems also limits any disruptive effects of a large scale integration of 
renewables. This has indeed been demonstrated for instance in small electricity 
systems in Central America (discussed in the next section). 
 
3. Cross Country Case Studies 
 
The use of single or multi-country case studies is a popular technique to study the 
process and outcomes of electricity sector reforms in many developing and 
developed countries (Jamasb et al., 2017). Case studies can examine issues that do 
not easily lend themselves to rigorous quantitative analysis or that cannot be 
analysed due to the unavailability of disaggregated data. Further, the relatively 
sparse number of small systems in existence3 limits our case selection to some 
extent, which is largely based on three parameters: 
 
(a) They fit the characteristics of small electricity systems outlined in Section 2.  
(b) They have common objectives in electricity market reforms, namely – 
improving electricity access and harnessing and scaling up their significant 
renewables potential. 
(c) These are countries/territories that presently have (or are aiming to adopt) 
sophisticated competitive trading arrangements in their wholesale power 
markets, despite being small in size. 
 
                                                          
2 This precludes the availability of storage at some point in the future. High prices would be needed 
for backup generation given the unpredictability of wind or solar energy, as backup generators would 
not know whether their backup plants would be dispatched. See Keay et al (2013) for a thorough 
exposition. 
3 Table 1A in appendix shows 88 island economies, countries and territories with small electricity 
systems measured in terms of installed generation capacities as estimated in 2014. 
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We choose to focus on two countries with smaller systems in Latin America - a 
continent with substantial experience in electricity market reforms – which have 
also successfully scaled up renewables. Power sector reform has been widespread 
in Latin America since Chile’s pioneering efforts in the 1980s in opening up the 
sector to private participation and competition (Millan, 2005). Latin America has 
also experienced the largest absolute increase in renewable energy investment 
among the regions of the developing world in 2015 totalling US$ 16.4 billion (6% of 
the global total) with Chile, Brazil and Mexico recognised within the top 10 largest 
renewable energy markets globally (IRENA, 2016)4. Furthermore, Nicaragua has a 
generation target of attaining 91 percent of its energy from renewables by 2027, 
while El Salvador has set technology specific targets for the scaling up of renewables. 
 
For the purposes of comparison, our third case study is Australia’s Northern 
Territory, where the policy lessons from Latin America can potentially be applied.  
Nicaragua and El Salvador are part of the SIEPAC interconnection- which has 
substantially benefitted their market reform and renewables integration goals – and 
the Northern Territory is similarly placed within Australia. Recent reforms in the 
Territory’s electricity sector have involved harmonisation of the local institutional 
framework with the national frameworks of the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) 
and the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) (NT Government, 2016). 
Hence, the institutional framework for intraregional market expansion by 
interconnecting the Territory to the larger National Electricity Market (NEM) is 
already in place since these markets are also becoming subject to relevant 
provisions of national energy laws and rules. Earlier studies such as Nepal and 
Foster (2016) have highlighted the importance of market integration in energy-only 
markets to facilitate the large-scale development of renewable energy in the 
Australian context. 
 
Nicaragua and El Salvador have a tropical climate with pronounced dry and wet 
seasons as does Australia’s Northern Territory. They have installed capacities of 
1345.77 MW and 1695.05 MW respectively. Both of these economies have 
significant potential for solar, geothermal and wind energy (IRENA, 2016)5. Figure 
1 shows that the share of renewable electricity generation capacities (MW) during 
2015 were 29% and 42% in El Salvador and Nicaragua respectively. Investments in 
renewable energy generation are almost at par with non-renewable energy in 
Nicaragua. Each of these countries attracted approximately 314 million USD and 857 
million USD investments in clean energy between 2011 and 2015. 
 
                                                          
4 This also include investments in hydropower. 
5 El Salvador has the highest geothermal energy production in Central America (with 26% of energy 
generated from geothermal in 2015). 
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In El Salvador the aim of adding more renewable capacity is to diversify the energy 
mix and reduce its oil dependency, given that 43% of electricity generation was oil-
based in 2015. Nicaragua, on the other hand, established an interim renewables 
target of 74% by 2018 and 91% of energy generation including hydropower by 2027 
in its November 2013 national plan for electricity expansion. Electricity market 
reforms to move from a vertically integrated monopoly structure to the opening up 
of generation, transmission, and distribution segments to competition was initiated 
around the same time in both economies - in 2000 by Nicaragua and in 1997 by El 
Salvador (Barosso and Perez-Arriaga, 2010). The energy markets of both these 
countries are neither fully vertically integrated nor fully liberalised, perhaps 
demonstrating the limits of competition. 
 
The Northern Territory, on the other hand, has transitioned to the market from the 
state by undertaking the accounting separation of the previously vertically 
integrated entity. The Territory is looking into competitive market designs of its 
wholesale and retail sectors. Approximately 99 percent of grid supplied electricity 
in NT is currently generated by natural gas while 1% is sourced form renewables. 
 
 
Figure 1: Share of installed generation capacities (MW) in 2015 
Source: CLIMATESCOPE (2016) 
 
3.1. Electricity Market Reforms in Nicaragua and El Salvador 
 
Nearly 30 years have passed since Latin American countries first began undertaking 
electricity sector reform. This was pioneered by Chile, which led to a demonstration 
effect in other countries, leading to a ‘wave’ of reform popularity in Latin America in 
the 1990s (Pollitt, 2004). 
 
29%
71%
El Salvador
Clean Energy
Non-Clean
Energy
42%
58%
Nicaragua
Clean Energy
Non-Clean
Energy
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Electricity market reforms in Nicaragua were initiated as early as in 1994. Prior to 
this, all operational and regulatory functions were assigned either explicitly or 
implicitly to the state-owned monopoly Instituto Nicaraguense de Energia (INE). The 
operational functions of INE were spun off into a new company, Empresa 
Nicaraguense de Electricidad (ENEL) in 1995, whilst regulatory functions stayed 
with INE. Electricity reform legislation was passed in 1998 which put in place the 
following elements (World Bank, 2012): 
 
 A wholesale market with multiple generating companies, remunerated in 
accordance with a spot price determined as system marginal cost of 
production (audited variable generation costs); 
 A contracts market established through the Supply Guarantee Obligations 
involving generation and distribution companies and large consumers which 
provides hedging against currency fluctuations in the spot market, and, 
 A regulated market of end-consumers, served by distribution companies at 
prices determined by the regulator (INE). 
 
The Nicaraguan electricity sector was also unbundled into a single transmission 
company (ENATREL) also in charge of system dispatch; ENEL’s generation assets 
were segregated for privatisation; and, ENEL’s distribution assets and functions 
were unbundled into two new companies and privatised (World Bank, 2012). 
Nicaragua’s thermal (oil based) and geothermal generation assets were privatised 
whereas its hydro assets were not.6 Notably, the government created a separate 
state entity - Comision Nacional de Energia (CNE) - in charge of planning, policy, rural 
electrification and legal initiatives. The MEM (the Ministry of Energy and Mines) was 
created as a successor to CNE as a result of a 2007 legislation, with additional 
functions that were transferred from INE such as licensing and oil and hydrocarbon 
policies, as well as the approval of regulations and norms in the energy and mines 
sector (ESMAP, 2011). 
 
In El Salvador, the development of the energy sector was in the hands of the state 
since the early 1940s. The energy sector underwent reforms that sought to redefine 
the role that the State played in the sector in the 1990’s (National Energy Council of 
El Salvador, 2016). Reforms started by allowing SIGET (Superintendencia General 
de Electricidad y Telecommunications), to be in charge of regulating the industry, 
which has been in operation since 1997. It was created as an autonomous body with 
its own budget and equity. A new regulatory framework created the environment 
for a more competitive power sector at both the wholesale and retail levels. An 
energy exchange has also been in operation since April 1998. The Salvadorian 
                                                          
6 This was primarily because it did not attract much interest from private sector investors; also, there 
was limited hydro storage capacity. 
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market has a regulatory framework that enables all participants to freely operate in 
generation, transmission and distribution activities. The current El Salvador 
electricity market is comprised of the following structural framework (National 
Energy Council of El Salvador, 2016): 
 
 A wholesale spot market (MRS) where the MRS price is production cost-based 
implying that the price of energy depends on variable costs associated with 
fuel costs and compensation for every MWh of power made available. 
Moreover, in early 2005, the remuneration of generators at the marginal cost 
of generation in the spot market was replaced by a ‘pay–as–bid’ scheme to 
account for the high spot prices due to increasing fuel prices (ESMAP, 2011). 
 A ‘competitively bid’ long term contracts market (CLP) subject to firm capacity 
availability involving generators and distribution companies under the 
supervision of SIGET, where the contracts are financially settled (in terms of 
monetary values than physically (MWh)) and stabilize energy prices for final 
users. 
 A regulated market of end-consumers, served by distribution companies at 
prices determined by the regulator. 
 
The restructuring led to the unbundling of generation, transmission and distribution 
activities and to the horizontal division of generation and distribution into several 
companies. The state-owned generator, CEL, maintained ownership of hydroelectric 
plants and created ETESAL (the Salvadoran Transmission Company) as a subsidiary 
company while all other distribution and thermal generation companies were 
privatized. UT (the Transaction Unit) was also created as a private company in 
charge of system operations and of the administration of the wholesale electricity 
market (MEM) (ESMAP, 2011). In 2007, a legislation creating the National Energy 
Council (CNE), as the highest authority on energy policy and the coordinating body 
for the different energy sectors was approved. Table 1 captures the normative, 
regulatory and design aspects of the electricity markets in Nicaragua and El 
Salvador. 
 
 Nicaragua El Salvador 
Initiation of Reforms 1994 1997 
Normative Entity MEM  CNE 
Regulator INE SIGET 
System Operator CNDC of ENATREL UT 
Market 
Operator/Administrator 
CNDC UT 
Transmission Company ENTRESA ETESAL 
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Vertical Integration No Yes (separate account) 
Market Model Wholesale Competition Retail Competition7 
Generators 12 16 
Transmitters 1 1 
Distributors 5 5 
Traders 0 11 
Large Consumers 9 2 
Economic dispatch Cost based Price bids 
Spot market price 
Short Run Marginal Cost 
with no Transmission 
constraints 
Average of prices based on bid 
prices of dispatched 
generators with transmission 
constraints 
Spot market 
Hourly energy price: 
marginal cost 
Hourly energy price: marginal 
price 
Spot market dispatch 
Economic dispatch based 
on variable costs 
Economic dispatch based on 
prices and transmission 
capacities 
Traded Products 
Power (MW) and Energy 
(MWh) 
Power (MW) and Energy 
(MWh) 
Capacity Payment Yes Yes8 
Long-term contracts9 Tender (80% of demand) Negotiated10 
Contracts Financial Physical 
Limit of Large Consumers 2000 KW 0 KW 
Transmission charges: 
Losses 
Transmissions losses pay 
by demand 
Transmission losses paid by 
generators 
Private participation 
Generation= more than 
70% of installed capacity; 
Distribution = 100% 
Generation = 70% of installed 
capacity; Distribution= 100% 
Table 1: Electricity Market Features across different Jurisdictions 
Source: Based on ESMAP (2011) 
 
                                                          
7 Distribution companies operate under regulated rates and quality constraints. However, based on 
El Salvador´s current regulations, competition is allowed in distribution even within the same 
geographical area. 
8 The Long Term Contracts (CLP) ensure a guaranteed income independent of the actual energy 
production. 
9 Distributors in Nicaragua must have contracted, in advance, 80 percent of their forecasted demand 
(for power and energy) for the following year and 60 percent for the subsequent year. In El Salvador, 
distributors must contract 50 percent of their forecasted demand (for the first year), with a maximum 
of 25% for each independent contract. 
10 Public tenders are used by distribution companies in Latin American wholesale electricity markets 
to select the most favourable electricity supply contracts with generation companies. Such processes 
are regulated and supervised by the regulatory bodies of each country such as SIGET in El Salvador. 
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One notable difference between EL Salvador and other Latin American markets is 
that the electricity Law technically authorizes vertical integration in generation, 
transmission, distribution and supply while generation, distribution and supply 
companies are prohibited from owning shares in ETESAL. This arrangement, 
coupled with the existence of a price -based spot market with retail competition for 
all consumers (including large consumers), makes the wholesale electricity market 
in El Salvador unique as it preserves competition. 
 
Both Nicaragua and El Salvador participate in an interconnected power system 
unlike the NTEM which remains isolated from regional interconnections, but for 
which interconnection to the National Electricity Market (NEM) and Wholesale 
Electricity Market (WEM) in Western Australia is an option. The Central American 
Electrical Interconnection System (SIEPAC) is an interconnection of the power grids 
of six Central American nations including Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
El Salvador and Guatemala. The objective of SIEPAC is to alleviate periodic power 
shortages in the region, reduce operating costs, optimize the use of renewable 
energy including hydroelectric power, create a competitive energy market in the 
region, and attract foreign investment in power generation and transmission 
systems (ICER, 2015). From the discussion above, it is clear that Nicaragua and El 
Salvador, while injecting limited competition, have retained regulatory control over 
some parts of their electricity systems. 
 
3.2. Renewable Energy Development in Nicaragua and El Salvador 
 
Shortly after implementing the electricity reforms, Nicaragua began implementing 
parallel legislation in 2005 to expand the share of renewable energy in electricity in 
its “Law for the Promotion of Electricity Generation with Renewable Sources”. It set a 
non-binding target for 91 per cent of electricity generation from renewables by 
2027. The “National Sustainable Electrification and Renewable Energy Program” was 
launched in 2010, which linked the expansion of renewables to rural electrification. 
A fund was established (the Energy Investment and Development Fund) for this 
purpose, which is funded through tax (VAT) receipts. Renewable energy developers 
enjoy a full range of tax breaks, including import duty, VAT and income tax 
exemptions. Electricity distributors must allocate a percentage to renewable power 
in tenders for electricity with biomass, geothermal, hydro, wind and solar being the 
priority sectors11. Electricity generation can also be contracted through bilateral 
contracts between generators and distributors and large consumers. 
 
                                                          
11 INE defines the percentage allocated for renewables in tenders based on the strategic expansion 
plan originating from the MEM. 
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Nicaragua’s main policy supporting renewable development is Law 532. It mandates 
renewable energy tenders for the biomass, geothermal, hydro, wind and solar 
sectors. INE is responsible for defining the percentage allocated for renewables in 
tenders based on MEM’s strategic expansion plan. Generators that do not have 
contracts with distributors or large consumers may sell their power in the spot 
market, where they can receive a price determined by near-term supply and 
demand conditions. The law also offers a variety of tax incentives for renewable 
projects. In addition to national exemptions, developers receive a reduction on 
municipal taxes. The government implemented a new pricing benchmark (reference 
price) for renewable energy technologies in order to improve the competitiveness 
of clean energy sources in the country in 201512. These reference prices apply to 
biomass, geothermal, hydro, solar and wind projects. Prices vary from $66-$80 per 
MWh (lowest range) for wind projects up to $103-$118 per MWh (highest range) 
for solar plants. 
El Salvador’s National Energy Policy aims to add technology-specific capacities of 60 
MW wind, 90 MW solar PV, 200 MW solar thermal, 60-89 MW geothermal, small 
hydro (<20 MW) 162.7 MW, 45 MW biomass and 35 MW biogas by 2026 (IRENA, 
2015). The country floats technology-specific renewable energy tenders, alongside 
offering income and import tax exemptions to clean energy projects. Tenders have 
been introduced to replace bilateral power agreements and encourage renewable 
energy contracts. The first auction for renewable capacity took place in 2014, and 
contracted 94MW of solar PV capacity that is expected to come online in 2016. 
Capacity was contracted at an average price of $116.2 per MWh under 20-year 
power purchase agreements. The bidding in a second renewable energy tender 
opened in February 2016. It aimed to contract up to 150MW of wind and solar PV 
projects for a maximum duration of 20 years from 2019. 
El Salvador grants tax incentives for development of renewable energy sources, 
including 10 years of import tax exemption to machines and equipment, and income 
tax breaks for renewable energy projects under decree 462 of 2007. The sale of 
credits under the UN’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) for renewable energy 
projects is additionally not subject to income tax. Furthermore, ETESAL is required 
to guarantee priority dispatch, as in Nicaragua, to electricity generated from 
renewable sources. Table 2 enumerates the existing renewable energy policies and 
instruments in the energy sectors of Nicaragua and El Salvador.  
                                                          
12 It is not publicly clear on the processes involved in determining the reference prices. However, we 
expect the reference prices to cover both capex (capital expenditure) and opex (operating 
expenditure) i.e. the totex (total expenditure) to make the renewable energy projects viable. 
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 Nicaragua El Salvador 
National Policy 
 Renewable Energy Target 
 Renewable Energy 
Law/Strategy 
 Geothermal Law/Programme 
 Biomass Law/Programme 
 Biofuels Law/ Programme 
 Renewable Energy Target 
 Solar Power Law/Programme 
Fiscal Incentives 
 VAT Exemption 
 Income Tax Exemption 
 Import/Export Fiscal Benefit 
 National Exemption of Local 
Taxes 
 Other Fiscal Benefits 
 Income Tax Exemption 
 Import/Export Fiscal Benefit 
Grid Access 
 Preferential Dispatch 
 Other Grid Benefits such as 
planning or other fee 
exemptions 
 Preferential Dispatch 
 Grid Access 
Regulatory 
Instruments 
 Auctions 
 Feed-in- Tariff 
 Quota 
 Hybrid 
 Auctions 
 Hybrid 
 Net Metering 
Finance 
 Currency hedging 
 Dedicated Fund 
 Eligible Fund 
 Guarantees 
 Pre-investment support 
 Currency hedging 
 Dedicated Fund 
 Guarantees 
 Pre-investment support 
 Direct Funding 
Other 
 Renewable Energy in Rural 
Access Programme 
 Renewable Energy 
Cookstove Programme 
 Special Environmental 
Regulations 
 Renewable Energy in Rural 
Access Programme 
 Social Requirements 
 Special Environmental 
Regulations 
Table 2: Instruments for Renewable Energy Development 
Source: Based on IRENA (2015); CLIMATESCOPE (2016) 
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3.3. The Northern Territory Electricity Market 
 
Australia’s Northern Territory Electricity Market (NTEM) is another example of a 
reforming smaller market.  The NT market is characterised by a small size (around 
700 MW of on-grid installed capacity) with scattered electricity networks, many of 
which serve the low density loads of remotely based indigenous communities, and 
often exposed to extreme weather conditions. Its location close to the tropics implies 
that the NT is also endowed with substantial solar energy resources. 
 
The NT market operated as a vertically and horizontally integrated multi-utilities 
business from the 1980’s until 2014 under the Power and Water Corporation (PWC). 
The Territory embarked on a set of reform measures in 2012 to promote 
competition and efficiency in the electricity supply industry and the greater 
alignment of regulatory arrangements with those operating in Australia’s National 
Electricity Market (NEM)13 with a view to improving efficiency and outcomes for 
Territory electricity consumers (NT Government, 2014). The Northern Territory 
electricity market is unique as it represents a small reforming power systems 
located within the same Australian national border. 
 
Reform measures so far have included the split of the incumbent PWC into three 
separate state-owned contestable and regulated entities in accounting and legal 
terms in July, 2014, namely: Territory Generation (the largest electricity producer 
owning 592 Mega Watts (MW) of installed capacity and contracting an additional 
114.5 MW from the Independent Power Producers (IPPS)) under a standard 
generation licensee; Power and Water (responsible for managing the networks) and 
Jacana Energy (the energy retailer). Further measures included the transfer of 
economic regulation of electricity networks to the Australian Energy Regulator 
(AER); establishment of an organized wholesale electricity market, and reform of 
the electricity retail sector. The Territory is looking to the NEM as a model even 
though energy-only markets are debated to be unsuitable for renewable energy 
integration, as discussed earlier (NT Government, 2016). 
 
The NT labour government has nevertheless adopted an ambitious renewable 
energy target of 50 per cent by 2030 (Territory Labor, 2015). Hence, there may exist 
opportunities to align the economic objectives of electricity reforms with climate 
objectives in the early stages of the reform process in the NT. However, uncertainty 
exists regarding the alignment of electricity market reform objectives with climate-
related objectives in smaller electricity markets such as the NT given the ongoing 
                                                          
13 The NEM is the Australian wholesale electricity market operating in Queensland, New South Wales, 
Tasmania, Victoria and South Australia. 
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“industry transformation”. The ability of the electricity industry in delivering the 
energy policy “trilemma” of secure supply of energy, affordability and sustainability 
is also being questioned and is attracting increasing support (see e.g., Keay, 2016 
and Pollitt, 2012) in the European context, Simshauser (2014) and Nelson et al. 
(2015) in the Australian context and PJM (2016) in the US context). 
 
The electricity sector in the NT is regulated by the statutory framework instituted 
in 2000 involving various legislations administered by the Utilities Commission, 
including the Utilities Commission Act, Electricity Reform Act, and Electricity 
Networks (Third Party Access) Act. This statutory framework is primarily 
responsible for regulation of the electricity sector in the Darwin-Katherine, Alice 
Springs and Tennant Creek power systems (also referred to as the regulated 
systems). 
The structural reforms of 2012 followed the commencement of the Interim Northern 
Territory Electricity Market (I-NTEM) in May, 2015 (Nepal and Menezes, 2017). The 
I-NTEM introduced an efficient economic dispatch of generation and basic market 
operation functions, providing a framework to facilitate the wholesale 
arrangements of electricity between electricity generators and retailers. The 
establishment of a market operator (MO) along with the existing system controller 
(SC) supports the overall reform initiatives by removing dispatch decisions from the 
previously vertically integrated entity. Consumers are allowed to purchase 
electricity from any licensed retailer approved by the Utilities Commission. The 
market operator is also responsible for the publication of market data including 
daily market prices and virtual settlement statements to market participants. Table 
3 details out the underlying features of the I-NTEM market. 
One of the prominent features of the I-NTEM is bilateral contracting of electricity 
between retailers and generators. This form of contracting is appealing for countries 
with small power systems and weak institutional capacity (Bacon and Besant-Jones, 
2001). The bilateral contracts provide for competition only at the time of bidding 
for the right to secure such contracts and do not allow competition to develop as 
trade takes place in the market. As such, bilateral trading is the most common 
successor to a single buyer once the basic requirements for competition in the 
market are met (Besant-Jones, 2006). Settlement for the contracted power is also 
carried out bilaterally, and each distributor is financially responsible for its own 
contracts under bilateral trading. 
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Figure 2: The I-NTEM 
Source: Adapted from Power and Water 
(https://www.powerwater.com.au/networks_and_infrastructure/market_operator) 
 
 
The Darwin-Katherine interconnected system is the only interconnected system 
linked by a 132 kV transmission line from Darwin to Katherine representing three 
quarters of the total Territory Generation Capacity. The power networks are highly 
scattered (see Figure 1A in appendix). More than 5800km of overhead lines, 3000km 
of underground cable and 40,000 poles connect Territorians to the electricity 
network (Power and Water, 2017). The Darwin-Katherine, Tennant Creek and Alice 
Springs networks are not interconnected and are separated by long distances. There 
are six licensed electricity retailers in the Territory, namely: Power and Water, Jacana 
Energy, Energy, ERM Power Retail Pty Limited, Rimfire Energy and EDL NGD(NT) 
Pty Limited (Utilities Commission, 2016). The predominant fuel sources used in the 
Northern Territory for electricity generation are gas, liquid fuels (such as diesel and 
heavy fuel oil) and with only a small proportion (one percent) from renewable 
energy. 
 
The I-NTEM is in a transition stage towards a fuller NTEM (Nepal and Menezes, 
2016). Wholesale prices are determined by bilateral contracting and generator 
dispatch is determined based on the generators offers as there are no financial 
transactions currently taking place in the I-NTEM. Moreover, the generators utilise 
the I-NTEM settlement statements to determine the settlement quantities for their 
bilateral contracting arrangements (NT Government, 2016). The virtual settlement 
price is an ‘energy-only’ price and does not contain additional components such as 
capacity payments to ensure capacity availability. 
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 Northern Territory14 
Initiation of Reforms 2000 
Normative Entity NTEM 
Regulator Utilities Commission (under AER) 
System Operator Power and Water 
Market 
Operator/Administrator 
Power and Water 
Transmission Company Power and Water 
Vertical Integration Yes (separate account) 
Market Model Retail Competition 
Generators 915 
Transmitters 1 
Distributors 1 
Traders 6 
Large Consumers - 
Economic dispatch 
Price bids 
 
Spot market price 
Short Run Marginal Cost with Transmission 
constraints (in the NEM) 
Spot market Half hourly energy price: marginal price 
Spot market dispatch 
Economic dispatch based on prices and 
transmission capacities 
Traded Products Energy (MWh) 
Capacity Payment No 
Long-term contracts Negotiated 
Contracts Physical 
Limit of Large Consumers 2 GWh 
Transmission Charges: 
Losses 
Transmissions losses pay by demand 
Private Participation Generation = 16.26% of installed capacity 
Table 3: Electricity Market Features in the NTEM 
 
                                                          
14 It must be noted that many features of the NTEM are still being discussed since the market is in an 
interim stage. 
15 See Utilities Commission (2016). 
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The NT Climate Change Action Policy (2009) established an ambitious goal of 60% 
reduction in emissions level by 2050 (based on 2007 levels) and of becoming a 
world leader in providing green energy in remote areas (Climate Council 2014). 
However, there are currently no formal climate policies, emissions-reduction 
targets or specific implementation plans to harness RE sources apart from the new 
renewable energy targets while the electricity sector has a key role to play towards 
decarbonisation. 
 
4. Policy Lessons and Discussion 
 
The electricity market reforms of Nicaragua and El Salvador have taken into 
consideration the limitations to competition created by the small size of their 
electricity systems in relation to the design of their respective national wholesale 
markets. Economic dispatch is centralized and based on audited variable costs 
(except in El Salvador, where it was based on prices but is poised to change to 
variable costs) (ESMAP, 2011). Both have established competitive wholesale 
electricity markets and implemented vertical and horizontal unbundling of 
generation, transmission and distribution activities to a varying extent. Alongside 
this, Central America also has the largest share of renewables (56 per cent) and one 
of the world’s most diverse mixtures of renewable generation, composed of 
biomass, geothermal, wind, solar and hydro (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2017). 
Several policy options are proposed below for the NT electricity market that is 
undergoing reforms in the advent of industry transformation. However, these policy 
options may also be particularly useful for smaller countries located in 
geographically complex settings such as the small island economies in the Asia 
Pacific, South East Asia and the Caribbean where reforms are ongoing and there is a 
need to decarbonize their economies. 
 
4.1. Increasing Private Participation in the Contestable Segments 
 
Both Nicaragua and El Salvador have significant private sector participation in the 
contestable segments of their ESI (generation and distribution). In both of these 
markets, the IPP(s) are allowed to sign direct long term contracts with the retailers 
unlike the NT. In El Salvador, large consumers can also purchase electricity directly 
from generators. Clean energy investments including private sector investments in 
El Salvador have increased from 14.32 million USD to 328.26 million USD in 2015 
while in Nicaragua, investments increased from 423.45 million USD to 1279.93 
18
 
 
million USD (CLIMATESCOPE, 2016)16. Therefore, a standard first step to electricity 
market reform in the NT is to allow Independent Power Producers (IPPs) to sell 
electricity into the wholesale market. Entry can be encouraged in the short-term 
through favourable (negotiated) power purchase agreements (PPAs) between the 
IPPS and retailers to create ‘competition in the market’. The negotiated PPAs can 
reflect the differences in energy technologies (i.e. promoting renewables over non-
renewables). In the longer run with more private participants, contracts could be 
auctioned or tendered as in Nicaragua and El Salvador to ‘compete for the market’. 
For instance, the use of renewable energy auctions has led to significant growth in 
renewable energy capacity in other Central American countries Costa Rica, 
Guatemala and Panama that are participating in the regional market (IRENA, 2016). 
Improving the enforcement of contracts and avoiding high transaction costs by 
streamlining the permitting processes to private investors is central to attracting 
higher renewable energy investments. Standardizing rules for contracting with IPPs 
through PPAs can also improve the credibility of the market for private investors. 
 
4.2. Network Arrangements 
 
Electricity generated from renewable sources is granted priority dispatch guarantee 
across both Nicaragua and El Salvador (i.e. electricity from eligible renewable 
energy producers is dispatched first). El Salvador also has guaranteed or regulated 
grid access for eligible renewable electricity producers while in Nicaragua eligible 
renewable energy producers are exempted from planning fees. Private participation 
through IPPs can be improved by changes in market rules such as ensuring non-
discriminatory access to transmission and distribution systems (Woolf and Halpern, 
2001). The NT could embrace these grid access policies as in Nicaragua and El 
Salvador. In addition, eligible renewable electricity producers can be exempted or 
discounted on transmission fees while also prioritising electricity generated from 
renewables in case of grid congestion. 
The case studies have also highlighted the importance of an independent system 
operator (ISO) such as UT in the case of El Salvador. The ISO then has a responsibility 
for controlling the access to and use of the transmission grid by competition 
generators and retailers including commercial solar power producers. The ISO 
model has been globally advocated as wholesale power markets have been 
                                                          
16 The government of Nicaragua announced that they will invest $10m in renewable energy projects 
during 2016. In April 2016, South Korea’s government confirmed it will loan $33.3m to the 
government of Nicaragua for the development of solar projects in 164 rural communities. 
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introduced and vertically integrated generation monopolies have been horizontally 
and vertically unbundled (Chawla and Pollitt, 2013). 
 
4.3. Regional Electricity Integration 
 
Energy integration and interconnections allow the harnessing of economies of scale 
and fostering of competition in smaller and concentrated wholesale markets such as 
Nicaragua and El Salvador, as larger electricity generators are able to be involved in 
larger transnational or trans-regional markets as opposed to being constrained by 
smaller domestic markets. Nicaragua and El Salvador countries participate in the 
Regional Electricity Market (MER) through an interconnected electricity systems 
(SIEPAC) through a 203 kV transmission network spanning from Guatemala to 
Panama (1830 km long) serving 35 million electricity customers (see Figure 2A in 
appendix for the geographical coverage of SIEPAC). The interconnected electrical 
grid is expected to attract foreign investment in power generation and transmission 
systems while substantially lowering energy costs; optimizing the shared use of 
renewable energy in the region and mitigating vulnerabilities associated with small 
markets, fuel price volatility and system unreliability (IDB, 2012). However, a major 
obstacle to the success of SIEPAC remains the lack of harmonization of regulatory 
policies of individual member countries.17 
Electricity market integration also requires adequate network infrastructure. which 
is particularly crucial for renewable energy development, considering the 
distribution of renewable energy resources and the need to extend existing grid 
networks to resource-rich and resource-poor zones, and manage intermittent 
generation. The lack of adequate network infrastructure is a barrier to renewable 
energy deployment as it increases the risks and costs associated with prospective 
renewable investments. The lack of interconnection between the NTEM and NEM, 
as such, can be considered to be a barrier in the development of large-scale 
renewable energy projects in the NT. However, the current harmonization of NTEM 
regulatory framework with the NEM can facilitate the energy integration in the 
longer run as the NT market expands. 
 
4.4. Policies, Incentives and Support Mechanisms 
 
Central American governments are aware of the importance of renewable energy as 
a means to reduce their dependence on fossil fuels as evident from their advocacy 
of clean energy policies. The strong political will to develop renewable energy is 
reflected in the ambitious renewable energy targets as in Nicaragua and El Salvador. 
                                                          
17Please see IRENA (2015). 
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Both of these countries have concrete policy mechanisms in place for advancing 
renewables such as tax incentives (in reducing costs, stimulating investment and 
increasing the competitive advantage of renewable energy sources) and the use of 
tendering has been successful in scaling up renewables. Newer regulatory 
mechanisms such as feed-in-tariffs exist in Nicaragua while El Salvador has 
introduced net-metering18. El Salvador also has adopted a specific national policy 
through “Solar Power Law/Programme” programme to support solar power. 
 
Both El Salvador and Nicaragua have recognized the importance of the investment 
climate and of stable financing in supporting renewable energy development. 
Policies are in place to hedge against currency volatility (usually denominating 
policy benefits in USD) to encourage foreign investments. Both countries have a 
dedicated public fund such as direct public investment exclusively to finance eligible 
renewable energy projects. Support is also provided for feasibility studies, resource 
mapping and other pre-investment activities for renewable energy projects. Similar 
policies could be adopted in the in advancing renewable energy development and 
meet its 50% target by 2030. 
 
4.5. Opportunities for Accelerating Rural Electrification 
 
Renewable energy provides opportunities for electrifying rural homes since the 
technologies make best use of the local available resources. For instance, in 2014, 
Nicaragua had one of the lowest electrification rates of around 67%, among all Latin 
American countries in 1990. However, by 2014, the national electrification rate had 
increased to 82% (World Bank, 2017). The average retail electricity price is still high 
as compared to other countries ($0.21/kWh in 2014) (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2017). 
The development of renewable energy is an attractive option in these countries to 
expand electricity access. 
Both Nicaragua and El Salvador have advocated a rural energy access programme 
that uses or seeks to promote renewable energy. Special environmental regulations 
are also provided for eligible renewable energy projects in rural areas. Nicaragua 
has also adopted a programme to specifically promote solar or sustainable 
bioenergy cook stoves. The NT can also integrate these policies into the renewable 
energy development programme and reduce the consumption of diesel among 
remote communities (including indigenous). 
 
                                                          
18 Feed-in tariffs (FITs) and net metering are designed to accelerate investments in renewable energy 
technologies by allowing energy producers to be compensated for the energy they feed into the grid. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
This paper reviewed the experience of electricity market reform in small electricity 
systems alongside the development of renewable energy in Nicaragua and El 
Salvador, and their applications to Australia’s Northern Territory system which is 
undergoing reforms and poised for an “industry transformation” as described in the 
introduction to this paper. Both El Salvador and Nicaragua liberalised their 
electricity markets, unbundled their vertically integrated utilities, and opened 
generation, transmission, and distribution to private competition. Contrary to the 
debate over the suitability of the standard model of electricity reforms as being 
unsuitable to renewable energy integration, these countries are also continuing to 
expand their use of renewable energy despite the range of fossil fuel (often 
subsidised) options in the markets. 
The case studies have underscored that electricity sector reforms and renewables 
can be complementary when supported by appropriate instruments and incentives. 
The economic theory of market failures suggests that goods and service with 
positive externalities, such as renewable energy, are always under-produced when 
left to the market due to free-riding (Bator, 1958). However, market-based 
interventions in the form of incentives and instruments can create a level playing 
field for both renewable and non-renewable technologies to compete and co-exist, 
something which has been advocated by earlier studies on other world regions. 
 
National policies with renewable energy targets and renewable-technology specific 
law; fiscal incentives through tax exemptions and support for the export and import 
of renewable energy/equipment; network arrangements such as non-
discriminatory grid access and preferential grid dispatch; regulatory instruments 
such as capacity payments and net metering, and financing arrangements to attract 
private investments (both domestic and foreign) can help foster renewable energy 
development across small electricity systems. The role of private sector 
participation in electricity generation and retail markets; interconnection with the 
NEM in the longer-run and the opportunity to align renewable energy development 
with expanding energy access in remote and island communities are equally 
important in expanding renewable energy use in the NT. 
Future research should focus on the capability of NT network infrastructure to 
support the high penetration of renewables and other network related loads such 
as grid-based energy storage and plug-in vehicles, etc. in the midst of ongoing 
industry transformation. The role of smart grids and smart network regulation in 
facilitating large-scale penetration of renewable into the grid is also an area of future 
research on small electricity systems.  
22
 
 
References 
 
Arriaga, I.P., Jenkins, J.D., Battle, C. (2017). A Regulatory Framework for an evolving 
Electricity Sector: Highlights of the MIT Utility of the Future Study, Economics of 
Energy and Environmental Policy, Vol. 6(1), pp. 71-92. 
Bacon, R. (1994). Restructuring the Power Sector: The Case of Small Systems, 
Viewpoint No. 10, The world Bank, June.  
Bacon R. and Besant-Jones, J. (2001). Global Electric Power Reform, Privatization, 
and Liberalization of the Electric Power Industry in Developing Countries, 
Annual Review of the Energy and the Environment, Vol. 26, pp. 331-359. 
Barroso, B.C. and Perez-Arriaga, I. (2010). The Changing Role of the State in the 
Expansion of Electricity Supply in Latin America, Energy Policy, Vol. 38, pp. 
7152-7160. 
Bator, F.M. (1958). The Anatomy of Market Failure, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 72(3), pp. 351-379. 
Besant-Jones, J.E. (2006). Reforming Power Markets in Developing Countries: What 
Have We Learned? Energy and Mining Sector Board Discussion Paper No. 19, 
September, The World Bank Group, USA. 
Chawla, M. and Pollitt, M.G. (2013). Global Trends in Electricity Transmission 
System Operation: Where Does the Future Lie? The Electricity Journal, Vol. 26 
(5), pp. 65-71. 
CLIMATESCOPE (2016). Country Level Insights. Available at: http://global-
climatescope.org/en/ 
Climate Council (2014). The Australian Renewable Energy Race: Which States are 
Winning or Losing? Australia. 
ESMAP (2011). Regional Power Integration: Structural and Regulatory Challenges, 
Report No. 58934- LAC, Energy Sector Management Assistance Program, The 
World Bank. 
Jamasb, T., Nepal, R. and Timilsina, G. (2017). A Quarter Century Effort Yet to Come 
of Age: A Survey of Electricity Reform in Developing Countries, The Energy 
Journal, Vol. 38 (3), pp. 195 – 234. 
Keay, M. (2016). Electricity Markets Are Broken – Can They Be Fixed? OIES Paper – 
EL 17, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, University of Oxford. 
ICER (2015). Benefits of Successful Market Integration, The International 
Confederation of Energy Regulators, Slovenia. 
IDB (2012). IDP Ramps Up Financing for Green Projects in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Available at: http://www.iadb.org/en/news/webstories/2012-03-
16/financing-for-renewable-energy-in-latin-america,9861.html 
IRENA (2015). Renewable Energy in Latin America 2015: An Overview of Policies, 
International Renewable Energy Agency, IRENA, Abu Dhabi. 
23
 
 
IRENA (2016). Renewable Energy Market Analysis: Latin America, International 
Renewable Energy Agency, IRENA, Abu Dhabi. 
Joskow, P.L. (1998). Electricity Sectors in Transition, The Energy Journal, Vol. 19(2), 
pp. 25-52. 
Joskow, P.L. (2003).  Electricity Sector Restructuring and Competition: Lessons 
Learned, Latin American Journal of Economics, Vol. 40(121), pp. 548-558. 
Keay, M., Rhys, J., and Robinson, D. (2013). ‘Decarbonization of the electricity 
industry – is there still a place for markets?’, OIES Working Paper EL9, Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies, November 
Millan, J. (2005). Power Sector reform in Latin America: Accomplishments, Failures 
and Challenges, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 40(50), pp. 5291-5301. 
National Energy Council of El Salvador (2016). Electricity Sector of El Salvador, 
Available at: 
http://www.cne.gob.sv/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=catego
ry&download=828:electricity-sector-of-el-salvador&id=72:2015-09-11-16-49-
40&Itemid=63. 
Nelson, T., Reid, C. and McNeill, J. (2015). Energy-Only Markets and Renewable 
Energy Targets: Complimentary Policy or Policy Collusion? Economic Analysis 
and Policy, Vol. 46, pp. 25-42. 
Nepal, R. and Jamasb, T. (2012a). Reforming Small Electricity Systems Under 
Political Instability: The Case of Nepal, Energy Policy, Vol. 40 (C), pp. 242-251. 
Nepal, R. and Jamasb, T. (2012b). Interconnections and Market Integration in the 
Irish Single Electricity Market, Energy Policy, Vol. 51 (C), pp. 425-434. 
Nepal and Foster (2016). Testing for Market Integration in the Australian National 
Electricity Market, The Energy Journal, Vol. 37(4), pp.215-238. 
Nepal, R. and Menezes, F. (2017). Regulatory Reforms in Small Energy Systems: 
Experience from Australia’s Northern Territory Electricity Market, Economic 
Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, forthcoming. 
Newbery, D. (2002). Problems of Liberalising the Electricity Industry, European 
Economic Review, Vol. 46(4-5), pp. 919-927 
Norton Rose Fulbright (2017). Renewable Energy in Latin America, LLP 3887, UK. 
NT Climate Change Action Policy (2009). Territory Climate Change, Northern 
Territory Government, Available at:  
http://www.savanna.org.au/nailsma/forum/downloads/Climate-change-policy-
NTG.pdf 
NT Government (2014). Northern Territory Electricity Market Reform, Information 
Paper, Department of Treasury and Finance, Northern Territory Government, 
Australia. 
NT Government (2016). Strategy for Northern Territory Utilities, Department of 
Treasury and Finance, Northern Territory Government. 
24
 
 
Pollitt, M. (2004). Electricity Reform in Chile: Lessons for Developing Countries, 
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, Vol. 5(3), pp. 221-263. 
Pollitt, M. (2012). The Role of Policy in Energy Transitions: Lessons from Energy 
Liberalisation Era, Energy Policy, Vol. 50(C), pp. 128-137. 
PJM (2016). Resource Investment in Competitive Markets, PJM Interconnection, 
Available at: 
http://www.pjm.com/~/media/768E4AC9442A428AA83776AFDBF48929.as
hx 
Poudineh, R, Sen, A, and Fattouh, B. ‘Advancing Renewable Energy in Resource-Rich 
Economies of the MENA’, OIES Paper MEP 15, Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies. 
Power and Water (2017). Networks and Infrastructure – Market Operator, Available 
at: 
https://www.powerwater.com.au/networks_and_infrastructure/market_oper
ator 
Sen, A; Nepal, R. and Jamasb, T. (2016). ‘Reforming Electricity Reforms? Empirical 
Evidence from Asian Economies’ OIES Paper EL18, Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies. 
Sen, A. (2014). ‘Divergent Paths to a Common Goal? An Overview of Challenges to 
Electricity Sector Reform in Developing versus Developed Countries’, Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies Working Paper EL14. 
Simshauser, P. (2014). From First Place to Last: The National Electricity Market’s 
Policy-Induced ‘Energy Market Death Spiral’, Australian Economic Review, Vol 
47(4), pp. 540-562. 
Sioshansi, F.P. (2015). Electricity Utility Business Not as Usual, Economic Analysis 
and Policy, Vol. 48, December, pp. 1-11. 
Sioshansi, F.P. (2017). Innovation and Disruption at the Grid’s Edge: How 
Distributed Energy Resources Are Disrupting the Utility Business Model, 
Elsevier Press, forthcoming, June, 2017. 
Territory Labor (2015). Roadmap to Renewables: Labor’s Plan to Transition to 
Renewable Energy in the Northern Territory, pp. 1-6. 
UN (2017). Energy Statistics Database, United Nations Statistics Division, United 
Nations, Available at:  http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=EDATA&f=cmID%3AEC 
Utilities Commission (2016). Utilities Commission Annual Report 2015-2016, 
Northern Territory Government, Darwin. 
Weisser, D. (2004). Power Sector Reform in Small Island Developing States: What 
Role for Renewable Energy Technologies? Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews, Vo. 8, pp. 101-127. 
Woolf, F. and Halpern, J. (2001). Integrating Independent Power Producers into 
Emerging Wholesale Power Markets, Policy Research Working Paper 2703, The 
World Bank. 
25
 
 
World Bank (2012). Nicaragua – Energy Sector Policy Note, Washington D.C. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/01/16383425/nicaragua
-nota-de-politica-energetica-vol-2-2-energy-sector-policy-note-executive-
summary-final 
World Bank (2017). Access to Electricity (% of Population), World Bank Sustainable 
Energy for all Database, Available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS?page=1 
 
  
26
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Asia 
System 
Size 
(GW) 
Caribbean 
System 
Size 
(GW) 
Pacific 
System 
Size 
(GW) 
Africa, Indian 
Ocean, 
Mediterranean 
and South 
China Sea 
(AIMS) 
System 
Size 
(GW) 
Europe and 
others 
System 
size 
Mongolia  1  Jamaica  1  Papua 
New 
Guinea 
0.9  Senegal 1  Montenegro 0.9 
Nepal 0.8  Bahamas 0.6 Guam 0.6 Uganda 0.771 Malta 0.62 
Brunei 0.777 Suriname 0.4 New 
Caledonia 
0.6 Gabon 0.6 Andorra 0.52 
Afghanistan 0.6 Guyana 0.4 Fiji 0.3 Mali 0.6 Moldova 0.5 
Macau 0.5 Aruba 0.3 French 
Polynesia 
0.2 Guinea 0.5 Faroe 
Islands 
0.1 
West Bank 0.1 Haiti 0.3 Marshall 
Islands 
0.052 Namibia 0.5 Greenland 0.096 
Maldives 0.082 American 
Virgin 
Islands 
0.3 Samoa 0.045 Madagascar 0.5 Gibraltar 0.043 
  Barbados 0.2 American 
Samoa 
0.041 Congo 0.5 Saint Pierre 
and 
Miquelon 
0.0276 
  Belize 0.2 Solomon 
Islands 
0.037 Malawi 0.4 Falkland 
Islands 
0.01 
  Cayman 
Islands 
0.1 Vanuatu 0.030 Mauritania 0.4 Saint 
Helena 
0.008 
  Saint Lucia 0.088 Micronesia 0.018 Burkina Faso 0.3   
  Antigua 
and 
Barbuda 
0.084 Tonga 0.017 South Sudan 0.255   
  Turks and 
Caicos 
Islands 
0.076 Cook 
Islands 
0.009 Swaziland 0.2   
  Saint Kitts 
and Nevis 
0.0642 Kiribati 0.007 Equatorial 
Guinea 
0.2   
  Grenada 0.050 Tuvalu 0.0051 Bermuda 0.167   
  Saint 
Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines 
0.047 Nauru 0.005 Benin 0.163   
  British 
Virgin 
Islands 
0.044 Niue 0.001 Botswana 0.1   
  Dominica 0.0332   Djibouti 0.1   
  Montserrat 0.005   Cape Verde 0.1   
      Rwanda 0.1   
      Seychelles 0.1   
      Sierra Leone 0.1   
      Niger 0.1   
      Eritrea 0.1   
      Gambia 0.091   
      Togo 0.086   
      Somalia 0.081   
      Lesotho 0.080   
      Burundi 0.066   
      Western 
Sahara 
0.058   
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      Central African 
Republic 
0.044   
      Chad 0.041   
      Guinea-Bissau 0.039   
      Liberia 0.027   
      Comoros 0.022   
      Sao Tome and 
Principe 
0.020   
Table 1A: 88 small Electricity Systems around the world with installed capacity of ≤1 
GW based on 2014 estimates 
Source: Adapted from United Nations Energy Statistics Database, UN (2017) 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=EDATA&f=cmID%3AEC 
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Figure 1A: The I-NTEM 
Source: Adapted from Power and Water (2017) 
(https://www.powerwater.com.au/networks_and_infrastructure/power_networks) 
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Figure 2A: The SIEPAC 
Source: Adapted from IRENA (2015) 
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